AT&T (1984 - 2005)-A POSTER CHILD

question 111

Essay

AT&T (1984 - 2005)-A POSTER CHILD
FOR RESTRUCTURING GONE AWRY
Between 1984 and 2000, AT&T underwent four major restructuring programs. These included the government-mandated breakup in 1984, the 1996 effort to eliminate customer conflicts, the 1998 plan to become a broadband powerhouse, and the most recent restructuring program announced in 2000 to correct past mistakes. It is difficult to identify another major corporation that has undergone as much sustained trauma as AT&T. Ironically, a former AT&T operating unit acquired its former parent in 2005.
The 1984 Restructure: Changed the Organization But Not the Culture
The genesis of Ma Bell's problems may have begun with the consent decree signed with the Department of Justice in 1984, which resulted in the spin-off of its local telephone operations to its shareholders. AT&T retained its long-distance and telecommunications equipment manufacturing operations. Although the breadth of the firm's product offering changed dramatically, little else seems to have changed. The firm remained highly bureaucratic, risk averse, and inward looking. However, substantial market share in the lucrative long-distance market continued to generate huge cash flow for the company, thereby enabling the company to be slow to react to the changing competitive dynamics of the marketplace.
The 1996 Restructure: Lack of a Coherent Strategy
Cash accumulated from the long-distance business was spent on a variety of ill-conceived strategies such as the firm's foray into the personal computer business. After years of unsuccessfully attempting to redefine the company's strategy, AT&T once again resorted to a major restructure of the firm. In 1996, AT&T spun-off Lucent Technologies (its telecommunications equipment business) and NCR (a computer services business) to shareholders to facilitate Lucent equipment sales to former AT&T operations and to eliminate the non-core NCR computer business. However, this had little impact on the AT&T share price.
The 1998 Restructure: Vision Exceeds Ability to Execute
In its third major restructure since 1984, AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong passionately unveiled in June of 1998 a daring strategy to transform AT&T from a struggling long-distance telephone company into a broadband internet access and local phone services company. To accomplish this end, he outlined his intentions to acquire cable companies MediaOne Group and Telecommunications Inc. for $58 billion and $48 billion, respectively. The plan was to use cable-TV networks to deliver the first fully integrated package of broadband internet access and local phone service via the cable-TV network.
AT&T Could Not Handle Its Early Success
During the next several years, Armstrong seemed to be up to the task, cutting sales, general, and administrative expense's share of revenue from 28 percent to 20 percent, giving AT&T a cost structure comparable to its competitors. He attempted to change the bureaucratic culture to one able to compete effectively in the deregulated environment of the post-1996 Telecommunications Act by issuing stock options to all employees, tying compensation to performance, and reducing layers of managers. He used AT&T's stock, as well as cash, to buy the cable companies before the decline in AT&T's long-distance business pushed the stock into a free fall. He also transformed AT&T Wireless from a collection of local businesses into a national business.
Notwithstanding these achievements, AT&T experienced major missteps. Employee turnover became a big problem, especially among senior managers. Armstrong also bought Telecommunications and MediaOne when valuations for cable-television assets were near their peak. He paid about $106 billion in 2000, when they were worth about $80 billion. His failure to cut enough deals with other cable operators (e.g., Time Warner) to sell AT&T's local phone service meant that AT&T could market its services only in regional markets rather than on a national basis. In addition, AT&T moved large corporate customers to its Concert joint venture with British Telecom, alienating many AT&T salespeople, who subsequently quit. As a result, customer service deteriorated rapidly and major customers defected. Finally, Armstrong seriously underestimated the pace of erosion in AT&T's long-distance revenue base.
AT&T May Have Become Overwhelmed by the Rate of Change
What happened? Perhaps AT&T fell victim to the same problems many other acquisitive companies have. AT&T is a company capable of exceptional vision but incapable of effective execution. Effective execution involves buying or building assets at a reasonable cost. Its substantial overpayment for its cable acquisitions meant that it would be unable to earn the returns required by investors in what they would consider a reasonable period. Moreover, Armstrong's efforts to shift from the firm's historical business by buying into the cable-TV business through acquisition had saddled the firm with $62 billion in debt.
AT&T tried to do too much too quickly. New initiatives such as high-speed internet access and local telephone services over cable-television network were too small to pick up the slack. Much time and energy seems to have gone into planning and acquiring what were viewed as key building blocks to the strategy. However, there appears to have been insufficient focus and realism in terms of the time and resources required to make all the pieces of the strategy fit together. Some parts of the overall strategy were at odds with other parts. For example, AT&T undercut its core long-distance wired telephone business by offers of free long-distance wireless to attract new subscribers. Despite aggressive efforts to change the culture, AT&T continued to suffer from a culture that evolved in the years before 1996 during which the industry was heavily regulated. That atmosphere bred a culture based on consensus building, ponderously slow decision-making, and a low tolerance for risk. Consequently, the AT&T culture was unprepared for the fiercely competitive deregulated environment of the late 1990s (Truitt, 2001).
Furthermore, AT&T created individual tracking stocks for AT&T Wireless and for Liberty Media. The intention of the tracking stocks was to link the unit's stock to its individual performance, create a currency for the unit to make acquisitions, and to provide a new means of motivating the unit's management by giving them stock in their own operation. Unlike a spin-off, AT&T's board continued to exert direct control over these units. In an IPO in April 2000, AT&T sold 14 percent of AT&T's Wireless tracking stock to the public to raise funds and to focus investor attention on the true value of the Wireless operations.
Investors Lose Patience
Although all of these actions created a sense that grandiose change was imminent, investor patience was wearing thin. Profitability foundered. The market share loss in its long-distance business accelerated. Although cash flow remained strong, it was clear that a cash machine so dependent on the deteriorating long-distance telephone business soon could grind to a halt. Investors' loss of faith was manifested in the sharp decline in AT&T stock that occurred in 2000.
The 2000 Restructure: Correcting the Mistakes of the Past
Pushed by investor impatience and a growing realization that achieving AT&T's vision would be more time and resource consuming than originally believed, Armstrong announced on October 25, 2000 the breakup of the business for the fourth time. The plan involved the creation of four new independent companies including AT&T Wireless, AT&T Consumer, AT&T Broadband, and Liberty Media.
By breaking the company into specific segments, AT&T believed that individual units could operate more efficiently and aggressively. AT&T's consumer long-distance business would be able to enter the digital subscriber line (DSL) market. DSL is a broadband technology based on the telephone wires that connect individual homes with the telephone network. AT&T's cable operations could continue to sell their own fast internet connections and compete directly against AT&T's long-distance telephone business. Moreover, the four individual businesses would create "pure-play" investor opportunities. Specifically, AT&T proposed splitting off in early 2001 AT&T Wireless and issuing tracking stocks to the public in late 2001 for AT&T's Consumer operations, including long-distance and Worldnet Internet service, and AT&T's Broadband (cable) operations. The tracking shares would later be converted to regular AT&T common shares as if issued by AT&T Broadband, making it an independent entity. AT&T would retain AT&T Business Services (i.e., AT&T Lab and Telecommunications Network) with the surviving AT&T entity. Investor reaction was swift and negative. Not swayed by the proposal, investors caused the stock to drop 13 percent in a single day. Moreover, it ended 2000 at 17 ½, down 66 percent from the beginning of the year.
The More Things Change The More They Stay The Same
On July 10, 2001, AT&T Wireless Services became an independent company, in accordance with plans announced during the 2000 restructure program. AT&T Wireless became a separate company when AT&T converted the tracking shares of the mobile-phone business into common stock and split-off the unit from the parent. AT&T encouraged shareholders to exchange their AT&T common shares for Wireless common shares by offering AT&T shareholders 1.176 Wireless shares for each share of AT&T common. The exchange ratio represented a 6.5 percent premium over AT&T's current common share price. AT&T Wireless shares have fallen 44 percent since AT&T first sold the tracking stock in April 2000. On August 10, 2001, AT&T spun off Liberty Media.
After extended discussions, AT&T agreed on December 21, 2001 to merge its broadband unit with Comcast to create the largest cable television and high-speed internet service company in the United States. Without the future growth engine offered by Broadband and Wireless, AT&T's remaining long-distance businesses and business services operations had limited growth prospects. After a decade of tumultuous change, AT&T was back where it was at the beginning of the 1990s. At about $15 billion in late 2004, AT&T's market capitalization was about one-sixth of that of such major competitors as Verizon and SBC. SBC Communications (a former local AT&T operating company) acquired AT&T on November 18, 2005 in a $16 billion deal and promptly renamed the combined firms AT&T.
-To what extent did AT&T's ineffectual restructuring reflect factors beyond their control and to what extent was it poor implementation?

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Definitions:

Brushes

Sliding contacts, generally made of carbon, used to provide connection to rotating parts of machines.

Field Winding

The winding of a coil around an electromagnet's core, which creates a magnetic field when an electric current passes through it.

Armature

The rotating part of an electric generator or motor that interacts with the magnetic field to produce electrical power or mechanical torque.

DC Motor

An electric motor that runs on direct current (DC) electricity, converting DC electrical energy into mechanical energy.