Examlex
Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
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