Examlex
Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections) . The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen) , then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game
-If you solved the game correctly, you will find that the Regime will hold elections so long as it believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a high enough probability. If there is some uncertainty on the part of the Regime and the Religious Party is moderate and wants the elections to go ahead, why might it not be enough for the party to simply announce to the Regime that it is a moderate religious party and not a radical one? Choose the most appropriate answer from the options below.
Inbreeding
The breeding of closely related individuals, often leading to an increase in genetic disorders and a decrease in biodiversity.
Special Concern
A status indicating that a species or environment needs careful attention or consideration due to potential threats to its well-being or survival.
Climate Change
A change in global or regional climate patterns, particularly a change apparent from the mid to late 20th century onwards, attributed largely to the increased levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide produced by the use of fossil fuels.
Food Sources
Anything that provides nutritional support for an organism, including plants, animals, and microorganisms.
Q2: Let E = 0.50. Write the payoffs
Q3: In Figure 2, what is the overlapping
Q4: All of the following are cited, by
Q10: "If a DEMOCRACY IS WEALTHY, then it
Q11: The B2B buyer decision-making model, comprising six
Q14: Which of the following statements about outsider
Q20: Describe what incapacitation theory is and its
Q20: Deterrence is based on the notion that
Q40: According to the implications of the Exit,
Q45: Minority governments are more common in parliamentary