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Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company.If both the parties bargain hard,each would gain nothing.If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million,while if they both accommodate,they each get $3 million.
-Is this Nash equilibrium efficient?
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