G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica

Question

Examlex · Accepted Answer

The Answer is G. E. Moore's "Principia Ethica" is a seminal work in moral philosophy, particularly known for its rigorous analysis of the concept of "good." According to Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to understand the nature of goodness. However, Moore argues that "good" is a unique kind of concept that resists the kind of definition that can be applied to most other terms.

Moore suggests that "good" is a simple, indefinable quality. He likens it to the concept of "yellow" in that both are simple concepts that cannot be broken down into component parts. When we try to explain what "yellow" is to someone, we cannot do so by defining it in terms of other colors; instead, we can only point to examples of yellow things or experiences of seeing yellow. Similarly, "good" is a basic concept that one understands through acquaintance rather than through a definition that refers to other concepts.

The commonality between "good" and "yellow," according to Moore, is that they are both simple and indefinable. They are understood through direct experience rather than through a composite of other qualities. This is in contrast to concepts like "horse," which can be defined by pointing to a set of characteristics that horses typically possess, such as being a four-legged mammal with a specific shape, size, and so on.

Moore's distinction between "good" and other concepts is crucial to his argument against what he calls the naturalistic fallacy. This fallacy occurs when philosophers attempt to define "good" in terms of natural properties, such as pleasure or desire. Moore's open question argument is designed to show that any attempt to equate "good" with a natural property fails because it is always an open question whether that property is indeed good. For example, if someone defines "good" as "what is pleasurable," we can still sensibly ask, "Is what is pleasurable always good?" This indicates that "good" and "pleasure" are not identical, as the former cannot be reduced to the latter.

In contrast, "horse" does not share this indefinability. If we define "horse" as a certain kind of animal, it is not an open question whether a horse is that kind of animal; it is a closed question because the definition captures the essence of what a horse is.

Whether one agrees with Moore's analysis depends on one's philosophical perspective. Some may argue that Moore's insistence on the indefinability of "good" is too strict and that moral properties can be understood in terms of natural or psychological properties. Others may find Moore's approach compelling, as it preserves the special status of moral discourse and acknowledges the intuitive sense that moral qualities are not reducible to other types of facts.

In conclusion, Moore's "Principia Ethica" presents a challenging view of moral philosophy that has had a lasting impact on the field. His analysis of "good" as a simple, indefinable concept sets it apart from other concepts that can be defined through their characteristics, and his open question argument remains a significant contribution to discussions on the nature of moral properties.

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica

Definitions: