T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other

question 6

Essay

T.M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other
In this selection from What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon sketches an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism that he calls contractualism. For contractualism, the animating impulse of morality is not maximizing some good like human well-being, but a concern to treat others with the respect owed to them as rational subjects. We accomplish this, according to Scanlon, by conducting ourselves in ways we can justify to others. Right action, in Scanlon's view, is a matter of acting according to principles everyone can accept. Thus when a contractualist thinks about right and wrong, the central question is whether the principles we act on are ones that no one could reasonably reject.
To decide whether a principle can be reasonably rejected, we must assess the principle from the individual perspective or standpoint of those persons in a position to be impacted by its application. More specifically, contractualism requires us to consider whether a principle burdens any individual person with costs more significant than the individual costs imposed by any alternative principle. If it does, then the principle under consideration can be reasonably rejected according to Scanlon. An important feature of this view, and one that distinguishes contractualism from utilitarianism, is that the costs associated with a given principle need not be understood in terms of well-being. On Scanlon's view, an individual may object to a principle on the grounds that it negatively impacts something valuable to her other than her personal well-being, such as fairness.
The selection concludes with an extended discussion of another important feature of contractualism, namely, its rejection of aggregative moral reasoning. For Scanlon, this is an appealing feature of contractualism because it rules out some of the intuitively implausible implications of utilitarianism, for example, that it is morally justified to impose severe harms on a few to produce relatively minor individual benefits if the beneficiaries are large enough in number. Scanlon, however, acknowledges that there are some cases where the right thing to do does seem to depend on the number of people affected. For example, in a situation where we must choose between saving either a larger or smaller group of people from serious injury or death, it seems clear that it would be wrong not to save the larger group. At first glance, it seems contractualism cannot accept a principle requiring us to save the larger group because the individual objections against such a principle would seem to be balanced evenly against the individual objections alternative principles would generate. But Scanlon argues that there is an objection any member of the larger group can make that effectively breaks this tie, namely, that any alternative to the proposed principle would not give positive moral weight to his or her life.
-Despite its rejection of aggregation, Scanlon claims that contractualism can nonetheless justify a principle requiring us to save the larger of two groups of people from serious injury in a situation where only one can be saved. What is Scanlon's argument for this claim? Is Scanlon's argument persuasive? Why or why not?

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