Above is the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty game between the state (S) and the citizen (C). E is what the citizen gets from her exit option. R is what the state gets from the support (revenue) of the citizen. 0 is what the citizen gets for remaining loyal to the state. c is the cost for the citizen of exercising her voice option.
For the following questions, let R =2. Let c = 0.25.
-Now let E = −.25. . Write the payoffs for both actors in the game above. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Please answer in the form (citizen's 1st choice, citizen's 2nd choice; state's choice).
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