Commitment Problems and Democratization

question 54

Multiple Choice

Commitment Problems and Democratization
In a paper entitled, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," Stathis Kalyvas (2000) examines whether religious parties are compatible with secular and liberal democratic institutions. He concludes that religious parties may be compatible with democracy so long as they can credibly commit not to impose a theocratic dictatorship if they come to power. He goes on to argue that some religions are better able to provide these credible commitments than others. We now provide a Religious Party Game that throws light on the credible commitment problem facing religious parties that Kalyvas describes.
The two players in our game are a dictatorial regime (Regime: that has recently introduced a process of democratization and a religious party [Religious Party] that seeks to gain power through the newly proposed democratic elections) . The Religious Party is expected to win the elections and many fear that it will turn the country into a theocracy rather than continuing the process of democratic consolidation. The Regime has to decide whether to hold the elections as scheduled or to cancel them and retain power as a dictatorship. If elections are held and the Religious Party wins (which we are assuming will happen) , then the Religious Party has to decide whether to pursue a moderate political agenda and support democratic consolidation or to subvert the democratization process and create a religious regime. The Religious Party comes in two types-moderate and radical. One way to think about these types is that religious parties have both moderate and radical factions; whichever faction is dominant determines the Religious Party's type. Moderate religious parties prefer democratic consolidation to establishing a theocracy, whereas radical religious parties prefer the opposite.
There are three possible outcomes in this game: Continued Dictatorship, Religious Dictatorship, and Democratic Consolidation. Figure 3 illustrates an incomplete information version of this game with cardinal payoffs in which the Regime does not know whether they are interacting with a moderate Religious Party or a radical Religious Party. Now answer the following questions.
Figure 3: Radical Religious Party Game

-If you solved the game correctly, you will find that the Regime will hold elections so long as it believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a high enough probability. If there is some uncertainty on the part of the Regime and the Religious Party is moderate and wants the elections to go ahead, why might it not be enough for the party to simply announce to the Regime that it is a moderate religious party and not a radical one? Choose the most appropriate answer from the options below.

• A) because the regime does not want a new religious dictatorship
• B) because the announcement that it is moderate is not credible
• C) because the regime will repress the party

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Definitions:

Counterconditioning

A therapy technique whereby an undesirable behavior is replaced with a more desirable one by associating the undesirable stimulus with a positive one.

Behavior Modification

The use of empirical and experimental methods to change or modify human behavior through various techniques and interventions based on principles of learning.

Token Economy

A behavioral modification technique based on systematic reinforcement using tokens that can be exchanged for desired items or privileges.

Institutionalized Patients

Individuals who are living in an institution such as a hospital or prison, especially for long periods, due to mental illness, criminal behavior, or other reasons.